Revision of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS necessary to control overfishing from Tue, 07/16/2013 - 15:35
Quicktabs: Arguments
The Convention also maximizes legal certainty for United States sovereign rights over ocean resources in the largest EEZ in the world, as well as energy and mineral and other resources on our extended continental shelf. The Convention provides the mechanism to assure international recognition of additional United States sovereign rights on an extended continental shelf. Moreover, due to overfished and depleted fish populations, effective management of migratory fish stocks and fisheries will continue to be a contentious issue for the foreseeable future. The Convention is widely accepted as the legal framework under which all international fisheries are regulated and enforced. The Convention imposes responsibilities on the coastal states to manage their fishery resources responsibly and provides a process for resolving conflicts between competing users. The Coast Guard defends United States sovereign rights by protecting our precious ocean resources from poaching, unlawful incursion, and illegal exploitation. Joining the Convention places these sovereign rights on a firmer legal foundation, bolstering the Coast Guard’s continued ability to ensure our Nation’s sovereign rights are respected.
In particular, becoming a party to the Convention will give the Coast Guard greater leverage in our efforts to eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. American fishermen are currently abiding by standards contemplated by the Convention and further detailed in the related UN Fish Stocks Agreement. They are adversely affected by foreign fishermen who illegally harvest highly migratory fish stocks. In another anomalous situation, the United States is a party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which is directly related to the legal regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, even though we have not joined the underlying Convention. As a party to the Convention, we would be in a stronger position to persuade other nations to abide by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and other modern international standards of fisheries management and thus advance our Nation’s interests in this field.
As national governments debate the merits of joining UNCLOS III, international conflicts over fishing rights continue to develop throughout the world. Of particular note are: 1) disputes in the Spratly Islands of southeast Asia; 2) negotiations between Japan and South Korea over the Islets of Takeshima; 3) negotiations between China and South Korea involving shared waters; and 4) conflicts over conservation practices between Canada, Spain, and the United States. These disputes illustrate some of the issues that need to be settled to solve the overfishing problem. In each instance, agreements are being worked out in accordance with UNCLOS III. Unfortunately, although UNCLOS III provides the framework to begin resolving these disputes, a great deal of uncertainty surrounding international fishing regulation continues.n185 In many instances who has the power to dictate fishing rights and territory remains unclear.n186 In some cases, fishing practices that lead to unhealthy depletion of fish stocks continue unchecked.n187 In other instances, temporary solutions are implemented, but the future still is unknown. Widespread acceptance of UNCLOS III would provide the necessary structure to resolve these tenuous situations.