Revision of U.S. position as a leader has been damaged by non-participation from Sat, 11/11/2017 - 17:10
U.S. failure to ratify UNCLOS raises fundamental questions regarding not only the future of legal regimes applicable to the world’s oceans, but also U.S. leadership in promoting international law and order.
Additionally, our partners lose confidence in the ability of the United States to make good on its word when we negotiate and sign treaties but don’t ultimately become party to them, especially as in the case of UNCLOS where the U.S. negotiated aggressively to win valuable concessions and won them.
Quicktabs: Arguments
Finally, the linkage between the need for the U.S. to maintain a strong position to defend U.S. and allies interests and the need to ratify UNCLOS has been cited in previous war games with international players at the Naval War College, such as the recent Global Maritime Partnership Game. Players perceived a gradual erosion of U.S. influence among current and future maritime partners that may have negative effects on U.S. interests. The need for U.S. leadership to ratify UNCLOS is warranted in order to prevent the erosion of U.S. influence among partners and in theaters of operation.
But this will change as these initiatives continue to reconfigure sea power itself. Consequently it is not surprising (but unfortunate) that the Cooperative Strategy failed to promote international law of the sea as the organizing principle and principal goal of U.S. maritime strategy. This glaring omission has been noted by numerous friends and allies, who time and again reminded the United States of the centrality of international law in their responses to the original thousand-ship-navy concept. Writing separately, naval commanders from France, Ghana, India, Portugal, and Spain all made reference to the importance of international maritime law in their comments on the thousand-ship navy published in 2006 by the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute.41 A year later, many of the same chiefs of service were asked to respond to Admiral Michael G. Mullen’s plan for a new U.S. maritime strategy. Once again, international law was a prominent feature of their replies; the leaders of the naval forces of Brazil, Peru, Portugal, Colombia, Uruguay, Lebanon, and Spain urged the United States to ensure that maritime security is rooted in multilateral legal frameworks.42 It is especially important that the vigorous expansion of maritime partnership integration propelled by international law be maintained. The maritime domain awareness provisions of the SOLAS Convention, the counterproliferation and counterterrorism elements of the SUA 2005 protocols, and PSI, with its informal nature, and Security Council action against piracy, constitute the greatest package of multilateral maritime-security commitments since the interwar period of the 1930s. The United States led each of these efforts, but there is a widespread perception that the American “brand” has suffered since and that the diplomatic influence of its friends and allies in Europe has diminished.43 Meanwhile, that of China and Russia is expanding. The upshot is a degree of doubt about the ability of the West to shape the future direction of international maritime law toward a shared vision of the rule of law at sea. This means that we should be prepared to make even greater investments in cooperation, and the development of international maritime law and institutions, to realize the goals of the Cooperative Strategy.
By the continual erosion of our nation's oceans leadership, badly needed American jobs are lost. The consequences are also serious as to how we are viewed by other nations. When the United States achieves everything it requires in a Convention, including a tough revision meeting all of its objectives, not to adhere makes it more difficult for America to negotiate other agreements. Our friends are simply astounded that the nation which achieved more than any other through the Convention has still not joined. They conclude from the flimsy arguments they hear against the Convention that America has simply gone isolationist. As such, our non-adherence continues to harm United States credibility and leadership in oceans matters and, more broadly, in our foreign policy. It is past time for Senate Advice and Consent.
Further delay in U.S. accession to the Convention, of course, bears risks and costs for the United States. The Convention became open for amendment for the first time in November 2004. This means that our ability to participate in consideration of any such amendments will be limited. The work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is proceeding: and as a non-party to the Convention, the United States is not eligible to submit a claim for the delineation of its broad outer continental shelf, which could hamper efforts to develop the resources of the shelf. More generally, by staying outside the Convention, the United States risks calling into doubt its commitment to the balance of interests codified in the Convention for uses of the oceans. In the long run, this could serve to undermine the order and stability on the oceans fostered by the Convention, to the detriment of U.S. interests and of all users of the oceans.
For the United States to refuse to adhere to a Convention even after the rest of the world met every single one of our demands for changes to the Convention will severely impact the ability of the United States to negotiate international agreements. I believe this will have a particularly serious effect on our security interests, many of which depend on mobilizing our allies. Certainly, as a sovereign nation, we have every right to negotiate a treaty and then decide not to ratify, but in this instance, where we specified the changes necessary for United States support that were then agreed to by the rest of the world, even some of our closest friends have difficulty understanding our behavior in not moving forward to date. A failure to ratify at this point will have adverse effects for our foreign relations with even some of our closest allies. We are the world’s most powerful military power, but we still need the understanding and support of our friends – and we need to act with consistency and reliability in our foreign policy;
Isolationism is not a strategy for victory against terrorism. The threat is global and our engagement must be global. That inevitably means that we must enhance our ability to influence other nations and to multiply United States actions through cooperative actions worldwide. If our country is viewed as simply turning inward and being unwilling to participate internationally despite agreements in which we have clearly served our interests, we will not facilitate such needed assistance from others. United States adherence to the Law of the Sea Convention will be carefully monitored by our allies, all of whom have been urging us to move forward, and it will have an impact on the climate in the war on terrorism, as well as other security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. The view that such Asoft@ considerations are unimportant is profoundly unrealistic. The Law of the Sea Convention is low hanging fruit that lets us send a clear message: America will support good international agreements, but it will stand firm against the bad ones. This differentiated message is crucial. If we are viewed as simply opposing all international agreements, no matter how favorable to the United States (as this one truly is), we will have far less ability to multiply our national interests through cooperative actions with others.
A fifth reason arguing for United States accession to the Convention is our position as a world leader. In light of its diverse maritime uses and interests, the United States is unquestionably the world's leading maritime power. Clearly, U.S. refusal to ultimately accede to a Convention widely regarded as one of the most important agreements ever negotiated would raise fundamental questions regarding not only the future legal regime applicable to the world's oceans, but also the leadership of the United States with re- spect to the promotion of international law and order. The regime of the Law of the Sea Convention presents a superb opportunity for the Untied States to provide world leader- ship in an area of increasing importance to the community of nations. Most importantly, by remaining outside the Convention, the United States would not be in a position to influence the Convention's further development and interpretation as it goes through a critical period of transition and refinement.
The United States strictly adheres to the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. We understand the value of upholding international law. By establishing universal standards for global issues, we give diplomacy a better chance of succeeding and help ensure that a large country like China won’t simply steamroll smaller neighbors when disagreements arise. Ordinarily, the United States would be in a good position to urge governments to stick to their obligations and abide by the Tribunal’s decision.
Except we’re not party to the Law of the Sea Convention. By our own choosing, we are shut out of the process. Despite the fact that the United States champions freedom of navigation and the international rule of law, our Navy carries out those policies around the world and has long supported joining the Convention, and the Convention has won broad bipartisan support, a handful of Republican Senators have undercut America’s ability to stand up for our own values and interests. This is particularly troubling at a time when one of the pivotal international concerns of the 21st century is coming to a head.
American leaders will continue to support the Tribunal and encourage governments to abide by its decision. But we can and should be doing more, to include ratifying the Convention itself. The stakes are simply too high for the United States to take itself out of the lineup. China is working to deepen divisions and consolidate its power in Asia. If China gets its way, it will derail efforts to establish a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific, worsen a potentially dangerous situation in the South China Sea, and undermine America’s ability to ensure maritime stability around the world.
A final reason arguing for U.S. accession to the convention is the position of the United States as a world leader. In light of its diverse maritime uses and interests, the United States is unquestionably the world's leading oceanic state. Clearly, U.S. refusal to ultimately accede to a convention widely regarded as one of the most important agreements ever negotiated would raise fundamental questions regarding not only the future legal regime applicable to the world's oceans, but also the leadership of the United States with respect to the promotion of international law and order.37 The regime of the Law of the Sea Convention presents a superb opportunity for the United States to provide world leadership in an area of increasing importance to the community of nations.38
By actively promoting "leadership for peace" in the politically and economically important area of an orderly codification of maritime laws and regulations, the United States could assure itself a major role in shaping a post-hegemonic global order.39 Conversely, U.S. opposition to the convention would not only jeopardize significant national interests in the law of the sea without substantially offsetting benefits, but also could constitute an implicit rejection of the promotion of world order through international law as a foreign policy goal. Viewed less charitably, failure of the United States to fully support the convention could reflect a belief that unilateralism is a viable policy alternative when backed by military force.40 Conversely, full participation in the Law of the Sea Convention ultimately provides the United States with an opportunity to exercise world leadership within the context of far broader international activity and participation than was possible during the cold war.