Statement of William H. Taft IV (April 8, 2004): Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention
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MYTH: The problems identified by President Reagan in 1983 were not remedied by the 1994 Agreement relating to deep seabed mining. Each objection has been addressed. Among other things, the 1994 Agreement:
- provides for access by U.S. industry to deep seabed minerals on the basis
- of non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions;
- overhauls the decision-making rules to accord the United States critical influence, including veto power over the most important future decisions that would affect U.S. interests and, in other cases, requires supermajorities that will enable us to protect our interests by putting together small blocking minorities;
- restructures the regime to comport with free-market principles, including the elimination of the earlier mandatory technology transfer provisions and all production controls.
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Joining the Convention will advance the interests of the U.S. military. As the world’s leading maritime power, the United States benefits more than any other nation from the navigational provisions of the Convention. Those provisions, which establish international consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts, preserve and elaborate the rights of the U.S. military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements. They achieve this, among other things, by stabilizing the outer limit of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles; by setting forth the navigation regime of innocent passage for all ships in the territorial sea; by protecting the right of passage for all ships and aircraft through, under, and over straits used for international navigation, as well as archipelagoes; by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond; and by providing for the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines. U.S. Armed Forces rely on these navigation and overflight rights daily, and their protection is of paramount importance to U.S. national security.
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A concern raised by Administration witnesses last fall regarding resolution of disputes concerning military activities has been satisfactorily addressed by the proposed Resolution. As I testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, the ability of a Party to exclude disputes concerning military activities from dispute settlement has long been of importance to the United States. The U.S. negotiators of the Convention sought and achieved language that creates a very broad exception, successfully defeating attempts by certain other countries to narrow its scope. The United States has consistently viewed this exception as a key element of the dispute settlement package, which carefully balances comprehensiveness with protection of vital national interests.
This Administration reviewed whether the U.S. declaration on dispute settlement should in some way particularly highlight the military activities exception, given both its importance and the possibility, however remote, that another State Party might seek dispute settlement concerning a U.S. military activity, notwithstanding our declaration invoking the exception. As a result, the Administration recommended, and the proposed Resolution includes, a statement that our consent to accession to the Convention is conditioned on the understanding that each State Party has the exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were “military activities” and that such determinations are not subject to review. Disputes concerning military activities, including intelligence activities, would not be subject to dispute settlement under the Convention as a matter of law and U.S. policy.
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The question has been raised whether the Convention (in particular articles 19 and 20) prohibits intelligence activities or submerged transit in the territorial sea of other States. It does not. The Convention’s provisions on innocent passage are very similar to article 14 in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, to which the United States is a party. (The 1982 Convention is in fact more favorable than the 1958 Convention both because the list of non-innocent activities is exhaustive and because it generally uses objective, rather than subjective, criteria in the listing of activities.) A ship does not, of course, enjoy the right of innocent passage if, in the case of a submarine, it navigates submerged or if, in the case of any ship, it engages in an act in the territorial sea aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State, but such activities are not prohibited by the Convention. In this respect, the Convention makes no change in the situation that has existed for many years and under which we operate today.
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I would also like to address the relationship between the Convention and the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative, an activity involving the United States and several other countries (all of which are parties to the Convention). The Convention will not affect our efforts under the PSI to interdict vessels suspected of engaging in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The PSI requires participating countries to act consistent with national legal authorities and “relevant international law and frameworks,” which includes the law reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention’s navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States. As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction. Like the 1958 conventions, the Convention recognizes numerous legal bases for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example, exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace; coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone; exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which the flag State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response to a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels. Further, nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent).
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U.S. adherence to the Convention is not necessary because navigational freedoms are not threatened (and the only guarantee of free passage on the seas is the power of the U.S. Navy).
- It is not true that our navigational freedoms are not threatened. There are more than one hundred illegal, excessive claims affecting vital navigational and overflight rights and freedoms.
- The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist the excessive maritime claims of other countries that interfere with U.S. navigational rights under customary international law as reflected in the Convention. But these operations entail a certain amount of risk – e.g., the Black Sea bumping incident with the former Soviet Union in 1988.
- Being a party to the Convention would significantly enhance our efforts to roll back these claims by, among other things, putting the United States in a far stronger position to assert our rights and affording us additional methods of resolving conflict.
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The Convention was drafted before – and without regard to – the war on terror and what the United States must do to wage it successfully.
- It is true that the Convention was drafted before the war on terror. However, the Convention enhances, rather than undermines, our ability to successfully wage the war on terror.
- Maximum maritime naval and air mobility that is assured by the Convention is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. The Convention provides the necessary stability and framework for our forces, weapons, and materiel to get to the fight without hindrance – and ensures that our forces will not be hindered in the future.
- Thus, the Convention supports our war on terrorism by providing important stability for navigational freedoms and overflight. It preserves the right of the U.S. military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements. It is essential that key sea and air lanes remain open as an international legal right and not be contingent upon approval from nations along the routes. A stable legal regime for the world’s oceans will support global mobility for our Armed Forces.
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[MYTH] As a nonparty, the U.S. is allowed to search any ship that enters our EEZ to determine whether it could harm the United States or pollute the marine environment. Under the Convention, the U.S. Coast Guard or others would not be able to search any ship until the United Nations is notified and approves the right to search the ship.
- Under the Convention, the UN has no role in deciding when and where a foreign ship may be boarded.
- Under applicable treaty law – the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea – as well as customary international law, no nation has the right to arbitrarily search any ship that enters its EEZ to determine whether it could harm that national or pollute its marine environment. Nor would we want countries to have such a blanket “right,” because it would fundamentally undermine the freedom of navigation that benefits the United States more than any other nation.
- Thus, the description of both the status quo and the Convention’s provisions is incorrect. The Convention makes no change in our existing ability or authority to search ships entering our EEZ with regard to security or protection of the environment.
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[MYTH]: The Convention gives the UN its first opportunity to levy taxes. The Convention does not provide for or authorize taxation of individuals or corporations. It does include revenue sharing provisions for oil/gas activities on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles and administrative fees for deep seabed mining operations. The amounts involved are modest in relation to the total economic benefits, and none of the revenues would go to the United Nations or be subject to its control. U.S. consent would be required for any expenditure of such revenues. With respect to deep seabed mining, because the United States is a non-party, U.S. companies currently lack the practical ability to engage in such mining under U.S. authority. Becoming a Party will give our firms such ability and will open up new revenue opportunities for them when deep seabed mining becomes economically viable. The alternative is no deep seabed mining for U.S. firms, except through other nations under the Convention. These minimal costs are worth it.
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The Council is the main decision-making body of the ISA. The United States would have a permanent seat on the Council, by virtue of its being the State with the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product on the date of entry into force of the Convention, November 16, 1994. (1994 Agreement, Annex Section 3.15(a)) This would give us a uniquely influential role on the Council, the body that matters most.