Skip to main content
  • Home
  • Debate
    • Overview
    • Positions
    • Arguments
    • Evidence
  • Resources
    • News
    • Bibliography
    • Authors
    • Organizations
  • About
    • Blog
  • Contact
Login     Register for an account
ARGUMENTS
  • Recent
  • Alphabetical List
  • Most Active
  • Random

COMPARE

Revenue sharing agreements in UNCLOS are not a reason to reject the treaty

Opponents of UNCLOS often point to the royalty payments required under Article 82 of the convention as a reason to reject ratifcation. However, on closer examination many of the criticisms of the revenue sharing agreeements do not hold up. The actual amount the U.S. would have to pay pales in comparison to the revenues that would be generated, a significant reason why industry represenatives have consistently been in favor of UNCLOS. Additionally, the concern that royalty payments would go towards anti-U.S. states and non-state actors could be mitigated if the U.S.

Related Quotes:
  • Royalties U.S. has to pay on mineral and hydrocarbon worth it given the extraordinary benefits U.S. would gain
  • Revenue sharing arrangement of UNCLOS is insignificant compared to value of resources and was negotiated with support of oil and gas industry
  • U.S. foreign aid could be used to offset any required transfers to states, eliminating any tax burden
  • Modest revenue sharing system in UNCLOS will not pose any burden on extracting industries and is in U.S. best interests
  • ... and 8 more quote(s)
Parent Arguments: 
  • U.S. ratification of UNCLOS will not be detrimental
Supporting Arguments: 
  • As a party to UNCLOS, U.S. would be able to prevent revenues from being redistributed to non-desirable actors
  • Revenue sharing agreements in UNCLOS are not the same as a tax
Counter Argument: 
  • U.S. should reject UNCLOS because of its revenue sharing agreements

VERSUS

U.S. should reject UNCLOS because of its revenue sharing agreements

By ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. would be subjecting its resource extraction industries to control by the United Nations. Furthermore, these industries would be assessed a royalty fee on these resources that the International Seabed Authority would redistribute to other states, possibly counter to U.S. national security interests.

Keywords: 
Revenue Sharing
Related Quotes: 
  • Law of Sea structure still favors discredited and corrupt redistributionist model for foreign aid
  • Actual royalty rate has yet to be determined, leaving US companies vulnerable to exorbitant costs
  • Land-based mineral mining countries possess equivalent voting rights to the US in ISA
  • Voting in ISA already beset by corruption and vote dilution
  • UNCLOS would create new international authority for a massive and unprecedented transfer of wealth
  • UNCLOS obligates states that mine the seabed to provide funds to subsidize its land-based competitors
Parent Arguments: 
  • U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would be disadvantageous
Supporting Arguments: 
  • Under UNCLOS, U.S. revenues from offshore resource extraction would be redistributed to non-desirable state actors
  • U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would give United Nations ability to impose tax on U.S. citizens
  • UNCLOS participation would require U.S. to transfer significant royalties to International Seabed Authority
Counter Argument: 
  • Revenue sharing agreements in UNCLOS are not a reason to reject the treaty

Open Debate Engine Status Block

There are currently:
  • 2 positions
  • 129 arguments
  • 1312 quotes
  • 220 citations
  • 590 news articles

There are 166 orphaned quotes, or 13% of existing quotes.

  • Arguments
  • Authors
  • Cases
  • Citations
  • Evidence
  • News
  • Organizations
  • Positions
About  —  Contact  —  Updates
Terms of Use  —  Privacy Policy
Site powered by the Open Debate Engine.