China views maritime surveillance within its EEZ as a provocative violation of its sovereignty

According to Chinese pundits, why did the US respond this way to such a small incident, especially if it is considered common practice for ‘US spy boats and planes [to be] monitored by Chinese patrols?’54 For example, in 2006, China followed a US vessel for 27 days without sparking a US reaction.55 Some Chinese writers posit that such incidents in the East and South China Sea indicate that the US has yet to accept that China’s regional influence is growing.56 Chinese writers acknowledge that China was more tolerant of US reconnais- sance activities in the past, allegedly out of consideration for the overall interests of bilateral relations and the need to safeguard regional peace. But in recent years, the Chinese leadership has conveyed its firm opposition to such activities.57 Chinese commentators articulated hope that the Impeccable incident has been successful at signaling to the US that it ‘should show fundamental respect for the sovereignty of other countries in state-to-state relations’ and that ‘no country can encroach upon our [China’s] maritime rights and interests.’58 These statements suggest that the Chinese media campaign was designed to assert its perceived rights and show nationalistic components of society that China was standing up to the United States. The Chinese public is particularly sensitive to infringements on sovereignty due to ‘the century of humiliation’ in which foreigners stripped the Qing dynasty and its successors of control over much of its territory and economy.59 As one author argued, if China lets a country infringe on its sovereignty even slightly, then its sovereignty as a whole, and in particular over contested territories, is at stake: sovereignty in the East China Sea, over the Diaoyutai Islands, Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, etc., are all connected.60 Statements like the following abound in Chinese mass communications, which suggest that China may be trying to create a situation in which it can claim in future negotiations with the US that its hands are tied by domestic pressure:

But the Americans have forgotten one thing. China is not so easy to bully . . . They will not trade with anybody their state sovereignty or national dignity under any circumstances. They are like that on the problem of Tibet; they are like that on the problem of the South China Sea. On matters involving state sovereignty, China does not budge.