Evidence: Alphabetical
-
Any risks to sovereignty from ratifying UNCLOS are negligible compared to potential gains for national security
-
Attempting to assert our rights through robust naval power is no longer relevant or practical
-
All Proliferation Security Initiative partners are already partner to UNCLOS except the United States
-
Article 19 of UNCLOS will not impact U.S. intelligence operations
-
Adherence to UNCLOS would not threaten the Proliferation Security Initiative
-
All important provisions of UNCLOS for freedom of navigation rights provided by customary international law
-
Any changes to UNCLOS are more likely to occur at the International Maritime Organization, not through United Nations
-
Article 310 of UNCLOS allows ratifying parties to submit signing statements to clarify their intent
-
Arctic contains huge deposits of oil and natural gas
-
All issues with Deep Seabed Mining identified by President Reagan in 1983 have been remedied in subsequent 1994 agreement
-
As a non-party to UNCLOS, U.S. can only use 1884 convention rules on telegraph cables to protect its underseas cables
-
Attempting to enforce navigational rights outside of UNCLOS framework would be an expensive undertaking and waste of resources
-
As sole global naval power, U.S. shouldn't constrain itself by making its actions subject to international tribunals
-
Arbitration clause in UNCLOS expands US options for resolving disputes, expanding ability to protect sovereignty
-
An adverse judgement against the US in UNCLOS tribunal could damage US economy
-
Acceding to UNCLOS would expose US to environmental lawsuits over climate change
-
Applying UNCLOS model to outer space would stifle nascent commercial space industry
-
Actual royalty rate has yet to be determined, leaving US companies vulnerable to exorbitant costs
-
Anti-production and anti-competitive bias of UNCLOS evident in its establishment of cartels and quotas
-
Accession to UNCLOS would allow US to better support its protests against intelligence collection within our territorial waters
-
Accession to UNCLOS necessary before businesses will invest in lucrative but risky deepwater and arctic resource development
-
Advice and consent resolution protects us from having to divulge military secrets in front of tribunal
-
As a party to UNCLOS, us would be able to block amendments and excessive claims that block military vessels
-
As a non party to UNCLOS, US lack's credibility as a maritime leader and when making claims to preserve its freedom of navigation rights
-
Abandoning UNCLOS in Arctic would undermine all principles UNCLOS is based-on, encouraging non-diplomatic solutions to territorial disputes
-
Abandoning UNCLOS framework in Arctic could lead to military confrontation with Russia, working within framework best way to resolve disputes
-
As a non-party to convention, US has no way of preventing convention from evolving in ways inimical to US interest
-
A stable governance regime, similar to that established under UNCLOS, is necessary for further commercial development of outer space
-
Article 20 provisions will negative impact ability of military to use underwater drones
-
All arctic nations are pursuing claims within framework of UNCLOS
-
Antarctica treaty is poor alternative to UNCLOS for resolving Arctic disputes because it was based on environmental protection, not resource exploitation
-
Assertions of legal rights to arctic resources have dubious legal standing while us remains outside of UNCLOS
-
Applying the UNCLOS model to outer space would help ensure rapid, peaceful development of outer space market
-
Arctic warming is unlocking potentially greatest untapped reserve of oil and gas resources
-
Arctic ice is melting faster than anyone predicted
-
Arctic tensions currently kept in check by agreement among arctic nations to abide by UNCLOS framework
Pages
