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Revision of U.S. participation in UNCLOS will not undermine national sovereignty from Thu, 08/21/2014 - 20:30

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U.S. participation in UNCLOS will not undermine national sovereignty

The sovereignty costs associated with the Convention are grossly overstated primarily because many of these costs have already been accepted by the United States. In addition, the U.S. stands to gain sovereignty over 4.1 million square miles of territory by acceeding to the treaty.

Keywords: 
Sovereignty

Quicktabs: Arguments

U.S. has already agreed to limiting the continental shelf in 1964 Convention

Ultimately, the Convention settled on an outer limit for the continental shelf of 200 miles,38 which satisfied many geographically disadvantaged states (those that do have a naturally wide shelf), but also allowed special considerations for states with naturally broad shelves by granting them a potentially deeper shelf of up to 350 miles instead of the standard 200.39 With the exception of the special considerations, Convention provisions limiting the continental shelf echoed those in the 1964 Convention on the Continental Shelf which set the limit as 200 miles and gave coastal states exclusive rights over its continental shelf.40 The United States is a party to the 1964 Convention on the Continental Shelf and thus bound by these limits.41 However, if the United States qualifies for the special considerations provided for in the Convention for states with naturally broader shelves, it has the potential to increase its continental shelf.42

[ Page 365-366 ]
Ashfaw, Sarah. "Something for Everyone: Why the United States should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty ." Journal of Transnational Law and Policy. Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 2010): 357-399. [ More (16 quotes) ]
U.S. sovereignty has more to gain than lose from ratification of UNCLOS

Many of these arguments have been put into perspective, however, by the actual history and operation of UNCLOS. Instead of posing a threat to national sovereignty, U.S. ratification of UNCLOS would actually enlarge U.S. power by providing a permanent seat on the ISA,58 and would be ―the greatest expansion of U.S. resource jurisdiction in the history of the nation.59 A permanent seat on the ISA would give the United States a strategic advantage, namely a ―greater ability to defeat amendments that are not in the U.S. interest, by blocking consensus or voting against such amendments.60

Concerns about abuse of power by the ISA are similarly unfounded, as the ISA operates independently from the U.N.61 and is comparable to other specialized U.N. organizations, many of which the U.S. already endorses. Further, the navigational protections for American ships on the high seas would enhance, not diminish, U.S. sovereignty.62 Some UNCLOS proponents also argue that claims to U.S. sovereignty are overstated in the context of a shared resource like the world‘s oceans.63 Finally, due to the inevitability of international reliance on UNCLOS to form international maritime law and regulate maritime disputes, the United States will suffer a huge loss of power if it fails to accede to the treaty.64

[ Page 360-361 ]
Hudzik, Elizabeth M. "A Treaty on Thin Ice: Debunking the Arguments against U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea in a time of Global Climate Crisis ." Washington University Global Studies Law Review. Vol. 9, No. 2 (2010) [ More (6 quotes) ]
UNCLOS expanded national sovereignty more than any other international agreement

Even more laughable is the charge of a conspiracy to create a world government. In reality, the convention expanded national sovereign rights more than any international agreement in history. Its central thrust entails an extension of coastal resource and economic rights in a vastly enlarged exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf, while furthering sovereign rights and navigational freedom. On the contrary, the corridors of the law of the sea negotiations were predominantly filled with thoughts of nationalism rather than internationalism. And ironically, in their attack on the convention, the critics join extreme internationalists who have been key opponents of the treaty because it focuses on national sovereign rights.

Schachte, William L and John Norton Moore. "The Senate should give immediate advice and consent to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: why the critics are wrong.." Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 59, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2005) [ More (18 quotes) ]
Socialists may have been involved in UNCLOS negotiations but they lost on every point with UNCLOS reaffirming state sovereignty

Now let me also say that by those first principles, I am deeply disappointed at voices which continue to violate, it seems to me, those principles in this Law of the Sea negotiation. Allow me to present a few examples. Over and over again we hear voices urging that the Convention would give our sovereignty away. The Convention gives away not a single ounce of United States’ sovereignty. This is not only false, but it is absolutely upside down. What was the reality of these negotiations? The reality is the greatest expansion of national resource jurisdiction in the history of the world. This was a coastal state win, hugely, not some kind of internationalist win for the straw argument Elisabeth Mann Borgese socialists24 that are cited over and over again by opponents.25 They lost one hundred percent. Some of the academic community did support that.26 They did not get anywhere near this Convention. This convention was a victory for nationalism and state sovereignty. And that is why you see the massive extension of 200-mile economic zones and continental shelves in this Convention.27

[ Page 465-466 ]
Moore, John Norton. "UNCLOS Key to Increasing Navigational Freedom." Texas Review of Law & Politics. Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 2008): 459-467. [ More (4 quotes) ]
US sovereignty harmed more by remaining outside the convention as it will be subject to customary international law without ability to guide treaty
The author placed great emphasis on the Truman Proclamation 2667 (1945) and the Continental Shelf Convention 1958, to which the US is party, as being sufficient to meet all the current US needs. In so doing he uses two arguments which, to our minds, are merely legalistic. Thus he said, n44 as a parser of forms of words, that the difference in context between a coastal state and a state party among separate clauses in narrative usage determines whether or not the US should ratify. This position ignores the fact that UNCLOS 1982 was negotiated by the global community in order to provide a uniform, codified system for ocean management, including the Continental Shelves, for all states. This seems to be made clear by the exceptionally clear definitions contained in it. Thus, most of the world has agreed to go along with a clear Continental Shelf statement in UNCLOS 1982. n45 While the US may, of course, go it alone outside UNCLOS 1982, there is little doubt that a generally uniform global convention reduces uncertainty and confusion for all states parties as well as it would for the US if it were a party. Acceptance would not only further the rule of law but would also be a step closer to the goal of making maritime law uniform. This elusive goal, of course, has seen some progress in the past 150 years. n46 The US can have a [*59] great deal of influence on future developments within the UNCLOS 1982 regime if it has the prima facia credential of being a party. Unfortunately, isolation only diminishes its influence. Here, there seems to be the face of a neoisolationist and parochial sovereignty thematically buried in the author's arguments against UNCLOS 1982. However, every state large or small gives up some of its sovereignty in accepting any international convention, treaty, or agreement to which it is a party. n47 Every act under customary law may have the same effect albeit less precisely measurable and not as predictable by other states. The treaties of Munster n48 and Osnabruck, n49 further embodied in the instruments from the Congress of Vienna, are the cornerstones of modern state sovereignty and statehood. However, even such treaties were never pristine and precisely geometric in concept. There never has been an ideal sovereign within an ideal state having ideal laws. Like all law, international law is a living and sociallyrooted concept making survival of the world body politic more likely. Indeed, that is the impetus for its existence. That body of law, however, can be developed, revised, discarded, changed, and superseded by the wellknown mechanisms suggested supra. This has a clear implication not addressed by the author to which we wish he had given thoughtful detail.
[ Page 58-59 ]
Cartner, John A. C. and Edgar Gold, Q.C. "Commentary in Reply to “Is it Time for the United States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention”." Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce. Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 2011): 49-70. [ More (6 quotes) ]

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