Revision of U.S. should ratify UNCLOS because customary international law is no longer sufficient to protect U.S. interests from Sat, 09/07/2013 - 17:16
Quicktabs: Arguments
International customary laws have developed out of “concordant practice by a number of states . . . over a considerable period of time,” when such practice is thought to be required by, or consistent with, the prevailing international law, and when such practice is generally accepted by other states.117 As mentioned in section III, the Convention itself is based in part on international customary laws. In addition, when an issue is not regulated by the Convention, the customary laws serve a gap-filling role, and because the Convention binds only its signatories, customary international law remains an important means of transacting with non-signatories of the Convention.118 However, the Convention expands the “existing norms to suit new developments where the existing norms are no longer sufficient,” creates new norms, and in some cases replaces old norms that are no longer appropriate.119 Thus, asserting customary international law will not secure all the benefits of the Convention for the United States because the signatories of the Convention do not have to extend specific rights established in the Convention, or those which are modifications of the existing rules, to non-signatories.120 For example, Canada may choose not to grant the United States the right of scientific research in the EEZ or in the continental shelf.121
If it ratifies UNCLOS, the United States seeks to gain “maximum freedom to navigate and operate off foreign coasts without interference,” for both security and economic purposes.87 If the United States does not ratify UNCLOS, it may attempt to assert these freedoms under customary international law. However, its ability to do so is growing weaker, as when coastal States extend their exclusive economic zones, “customary international law may . . . evolve[] in a way contrary to [American] [i]nterests.”88 Customary law is “not universally accepted, evolves based on State practice, and does not provide access to the Convention’s procedural mechanisms, such as the continental shelf commission.”89 The United States may make excessive maritime claims through customary international law or military operations, but either such approach is “less certain, more risky, and more costly” than working under the UNCLOS framework.90
Furthermore, experts often disagree on the existing norms of international law.122 The ambiguity exists because the international customary law that applies to ocean activities is derived from numerous conventions, judicial decisions, state practice, and interpretations by international organizations. The customary law is not universally accepted, and it changes over time based on state practice.123 To obtain financing and insurance and avoid litigation risk, “U.S. companies want the legal certainty that would be secured through the Convention’s procedures in order to engage in oil, gas, and mineral extraction on our extended continental shelf.”124 Also, American companies may not use customary law to claim the right to seabed mining. There is no customary practice for dealing with seabed mining, and such practice is necessary for the formation of customary law.125
Moreover, because it is so difficult to prove the extent of customary law, according to some experts, “[a]bsent express agreement, mandatory obedience to the decisions of international organizations or tribunals is for all practical purposes out of the question.”126 The weaker the sense of legitimacy, the less restrained state practice is likely to be. There is a tendency among nations “to take treaty obligations more seriously than customary law obligations,” which leads to increased self-restraint.127 As Admiral Mullen testified when he was Vice Chief of Naval Operations, “[i]t is too risky to continue relying upon unwritten customary international law as the primary legal basis to support U.S. military operations.”128
There is significant danger in relying so heavily on customary international law to support U.S. desires, and especially to guarantee the movement of our naval expeditionary forces. Customary law is inherently "fuzzy around the edges" and vague on details. This customary law is constantly evolving through a process of claim and counter claim,55 representing an inherently unstable landscape. Some states, especially newly indepen- dent states, do not recognize customary law. They view it as a body of law, frequently formed without their participation or consent, that promotes the interests of developed nations—often former colonial powers—without considering and reflecting those of the developing world56. Finally, customary law is especially difficult to enforce and maintain, requiring, for example, the comprehensive U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program to maintain57 the United States' desired level of freedom of navigation and overflight.
Legal scholars have noted that governments are more inclined to respect obligations to which formal consent has been given by the highest political authorities and that even if the Convention is declaratory of customary international law, this leaves much room for argument about important details. They further argue that without widespread ratification of the Convention, inevitable "violations" are more easily interpreted as evi- dence that state practice, the ultimate source of customary law, is not necessarily rooted 58 in the Convention.
The Convention guarantees rights of innocent passage through territorial seas, transit passage through straits and archipelagoes, and freedom of all vessels on the high seas. Seafaring vessels, such as container ships, crude oil tankers, and bulk carriers, carry over 95 percent of all goods imported to or exported from the United States. Guaranteeing their free movement is both an economic and a national security concern, as these ships transport the majority of this country’s oil and other crucial commodities and goods.
The Convention’s detractors argue that U.S. ships can rely on customary international law to ensure their mobility. But customary international law is not well- suited to the needs of business. By definition, it is hard to find and apply customary law because it does not exist in one place. Its rules can and will shift over time. Shipping companies benefit from a set of stable, written rules that they can easily reference during a dispute. The Law of the Sea Convention serves this function by codifying key navigational rights in a single, central authority.
The treaty would officially give U.S. fisherman priority over stocks adjacent to the American coast, and the U.S. Navy would continue to navigate the globe unimpeded. But the U.S., almost alone, has never ratified the treaty it sought and needed, despite the efforts of every President since, because the rule is so customary that it goes mostly unchallenged.
Those who oppose ratification believe that regardless of whether the U.S. is a part of it or not, the Treaty, in binding others, provides the ground rules the U.S. seeks generally and now needs in the Arctic. This is a delusion.
Without the U.S. ratification of the Treaty, which would greatly support its integrity, the agreed upon 200-mile zone deal is under great stress around the world. The South China Sea is a prime example where the 200-mile zone deal is threatened as China claims much more, and the Arctic Ocean will be another. The U.S. must be able to legitimately defend its interests; It could challenge the encroachment of others as a ratified member of the treaty.
And this expression of the national interest has been the precise locus of the isolationist backlash against UNCLOS. Treaty opponents have been unable to mount a serious challenge to the underlying substantive policy goals in favor of ratification of the Convention by the United States. The ability of the U.S. Navy to project power, under its Freedom of Navigation (FON) program as part of UNCLOS,9 has received a lot of negative attention of late, as coastal states (especially archipelagic nations and those bordering strategic straits)10 have renewed attempts to limit access by constraining the doctrines of innocent and transit passage under UNCLOS. Treaty opponents have cleverly argued that there is no need for the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS because all of its FON provisions are already reflected in customary international law (CIL). The problem – as recognized by the Pentagon – is that CIL formulations for FON are largely derived from the state practice following the 1958 Geneva Conventions (to which the U.S. is a party).11 It is not a credible international legal position, however, to rely on CIL frozen-in-time nearly a half-century ago. In order for the U.S. to effectively object to improper impositions of navigation interferences by coastal states, there must be a baseline (both literally and figuratively)12 of state behavior – and that standard is UNCLOS.
Customary international law cannot unequivocally guarantee that the same benefits the United States currently enjoys under UNCLOS can be secured for the indefinite future.194 By its very nature, customary international law is not always universally accepted and also may change over time based on State practice.194 Therefore, it is illogical to operate under the presumption that customary international law will always mirror UNCLOS. The only way to permanently retain these rights, such that they are always at the disposal of the US, is to solidify them through treaty law.195 It is almost amusing that UNCLOS opponents, of. ten the most vocal critics of the uncertainty of customary international law, are simultaneously impelling the US military and US businesses to exclusively rely on it to protect their essential interests.196
Continuing to rely on an idealistic conception of customary international law for asserting maritime navigational rights and for exploiting deep sea-bed resources, as opposed to deriving them from UNCLOS, undermines American national security objectives and deprives the US Navy of an essential tool needed for resolving disputes peacefully. Such ethnocentric derogation towards UNCLOS will inevitably expose the Navy to increased risks of military conflict.197